ENACT Majlis 2026

FASTER THAN THE SHOCKS Building a more resilient and intelligent energy system ENACT Majlis Abu Dhabi, 1 November 2026 Prepared with analysis by:

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Contents | Executive Summary | 06 | | 1. Disruption is becoming structural as the energy system simultaneously faces a new wave of demand | 08 | | 2. Resilience must be valued as an investment in long-term stability and growth, with capital mobilized through | 16 | | bankable projects | | 3. Resilience requires balancing efficiency with preparedness, flexibility and recovery, underpinned by better | 28 | | data and visibility across increasingly interconnected supply chains | | 4. AI, robotics and physical intelligence can transform how energy systems anticipate threats, optimize assets, | 32 | | respond to disruption and recover provided they are deployed at scale | | 5. Resilience is ultimately a collective endeavor: trusted partnerships, effective policy and public understanding | 38 | | will be critical to mobilizing capital, sharing risk and intelligence, and sustaining investment at scale | | Moving Resilience from Ambition to Action | 43 | | Acknowledgements | 44 | 4

5 ENACT brings together leaders across diverse energy, advanced technology and investment to drive action on the energy systems that underpin global growth, technological advancement, industrial transformation and human progress. A future-focused, solutions-driven forum, the ENACT Majlis anticipates shifts, confronts emerging realities and builds bridges across sectors and geographies. Its purpose is not simply to understand change, but to move from insight to solutions, partnerships and implementation. In 2026, the fourth ENACT Majlis continues to evolve with the forces reshaping global growth and the energy system. The world has been reminded of the consequences when a more energy-intensive economy collides with a more exposed energy system. While energy demand continues to increase, we see geopolitical, physical and cyber disruption is becoming faster, more frequent and increasingly asymmetric. The world needs an energy system that can do more than withstand occasional shocks; it must perform under continuous pressure. Because energy security underpins economic stability. The ENACT discussion focused on the solutions and opportunities to build a more resilient, integrated and intelligent energy system. Translating those ideas into investment priorities, new partnership models and practical routes to delivery. This report captures the discussion, solutions and how they can be financed, deployed and scaled through investable infrastructure, intelligent operations and trusted partnerships. The purpose of this document is not simply to record what leaders discussed, but to turn insight into concrete opportunities — while distinguishing emerging ideas from commitments already made. ENACT: A CATALYST FOR ENERGY ACTION

6 From shared diagnosis and the case for collective action, to defining solutions, and now developing the practical how. On 1 November 2026, the fourth ENACT Majlis convened global leaders across energy, technology, finance and government to address a defining challenge: how to build more resilient, intelligent energy systems capable of meeting rising demand, withstanding disruption and enabling future economic growth. The discussion moved beyond identifying vulnerabilities towards identifying the investment, technology, policies and partnerships needed to turn resilience into practical action. Across the discussion, consensus emerged that resilience is not simply about protecting today’s energy system, but enabling the reliable supply, investment and innovation required for tomorrow’s economic growth. Five key conclusions emerged from the discussion: 1 Disruption is becoming structural as the energy system simultaneously faces a new wave of demand. 2 Resilience must be valued as an investment in long-term stability and growth, with capital mobilized through bankable projects and new partnerships. 3 Resilience requires balancing efficiency with preparedness, flexibility and recovery, underpinned by better data and visibility across increasingly interconnected supply chains. 4 AI, robotics and physical intelligence can transform how energy systems anticipate threats, optimize assets, respond to disruption and recover - provided they are deployed at scale. 5 Resilience is ultimately a collective endeavor: system design, trusted partnerships, effective policy and public confidence will all be critical to mobilizing capital, sharing risk and intelligence, and sustaining investment at scale. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

7 DR. SULTAN AHMED AL JABER / OPENING ADDRESS, ADIPEC 2026 / NOVEMBER 2, 2026 “For years, our industry optimized for just in time. And to tell you the truth, we got very good at it. Then we got the bill for just in case.”

8 01 Disruption is becoming structural as the energy system simultaneously faces a new wave of demand

9 Energy systems are operating in an increasingly volatile and complex disruption environment. Physical, cyber and climate threats are increasing across an increasingly interconnected energy system, while demand growth is being driven by power-intensive AI, data centers and rapidly expanding developing economies. This year alone, Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure removed approximately 3% of global seaborne diesel supply from the market, while the shutdown of Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline placed ~9% of global seaborne crude trade at risk. 1.1 DISRUPTION IS NOW A PERSISTENT FEATURE OF ENERGY SYSTEMS i. Strait of Hormuz, Suez Canal, Bab El-Mandab, Panama Canal, Strait of Malacca, and Bosphorus/ Dardanelles Strait Systems therefore are challenged to absorb more frequent shocks while expanding supply, maintaining affordability and adapting infrastructure to new demand patterns. Physical attacks on energy infrastructure have increased approximately 6x as geopolitical tensions have intensified, as shown in Figure 1. Alongside physical attacks, cyberattacks have emerged as a systemic threat to the energy system. As energy assets become increasingly digitalized and interconnected, the attack surface now extends across pipelines, refineries, power plants, grids and renewable fleets. UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “WITH AI COMING IN, THE RISK HAS GONE UP BY 20X UP TO 50X” Cyberattack attempts on energy companies have more than doubled since 2024, reaching an average of 2,800 per company per week in 2026, as shown in Figure 2. FIGURE 1:Recorded physical attacks on global energy infrastructurei Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global FIGURE 2:Cyberattack attempts on energy companiesi

10 Unlike physical strikes, cyberattacks can disable multiple assets remotely and simultaneously, with consequences that extend well beyond the targeted company, as shown for selected examples in Table 1. The risk is amplified when critical infrastructure is concentrated in one location. Virginia, for example, hosts around 6% of global data center capacity. A malware or cyber threat there could have consequences far beyond the region itself. Additionally, climate hazards are becoming a persistent physical threat to energy security, particularly for power assets. Extreme heat, drought, water stress, flooding and wildfire are already disrupting generation and transmission networks worldwide. By 2050, more than 85% of today’s installed power capacity would be exposed to major climate hazard, with exposure reaching 100% in the Middle East and Africa and rising most sharply in Europe. 1.1 DISRUPTION IS NOW A PERSISTENT FEATURE OF ENERGY SYSTEMS UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “AI HAS ACCELERATED CYBER THREATS TO ALL INDUSTRIES, INCLUDING THE ENERGY INDUSTRY” 45% of US East Coast fuel supply halted and a 5,500-mile pipeline shut for 6 days after a ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline, 20213 11 GW of wind capacity lost remote monitoring and control after a satellite-network cyberattack affected 5,800 turbines across Central Europe, February 20224 22 energy companies compromised, some forced into island-mode operation, in the largest coordinated multi- day cyberattack in Denmark, May 20235 ~500,000 heating customers placed at risk after a destructive cyberattack penetrated a major CHP plant in Poland, December 20256 Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “WE HAVE NORMALIZED THESE RISKS OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS… WE HAVE TO WAKE UP TO A NEW REALITY AND RESPOND ACCORDINGLY.” FIGURE 3:Global power capacity exposed to climate physical hazards Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global As shown in Table 2, a selection of recent weather- related disruptions highlights the increasing vulnerability of energy systems, infrastructure and critical supply chains to extreme weather events. TABLE 1:MAJOR CYBERATTACKS ON ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

11 Energy systems are increasingly interconnected with global trade, industry, technology and critical supply chains. Maritime chokepoints provide one visible example: as seen in Figure 4 roughly 53% of globally traded seaborne crude oil transits through just six major maritime corridors. The Strait of Hormuz 1.2 INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS AMPLIFY THE IMPACT OF DISRUPTION Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global 3 Mn+ households lost power after Super Typhoon Rai toppled 260+ transmission towers, with reconnection taking up to 4 months - the Philippines, 20217 23% drop in French nuclear output, the lowest since 1988, as extreme heat and drought turned France into a net power importer - France, 20228 ~30% fewer daily Panama Canal crossings as drought cut transits from 36 to 24 ships per day - Panama Canal, 20239 75% of Serbia's planned fuel imports never arrived as low Danube levels left barges carrying only a third of their capacity - Serbia, July 202610 illustrates how disruption at a single strategic corridor can trigger disproportionate global consequences, rapidly transmitting risks through energy markets, trade networks and the broader economy. FIGURE 4: Oil and refined products transit volumes through key maritime chokepoints, 2025xii TABLE 2: IMPACT OF MAJOR WEATHER-RELATED DISRUPTIONS TO THE ENERGY SYSTEM

12 1.3 THE IMPACT OF VULNERABILITIES EXTENDS BEYOND ENERGY Beyond fuels, disruption in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrated how disruption to critical energy corridors can cascade into strategic supply chains. For instance, Qatar accounts for around 35% of global helium production, with exports transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Semiconductor manufacturing represents around 20% of global helium demand, creating a direct link between energy chokepoints and technology supply chains. UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “IMPACT EXTENDS BEYOND ENERGY, IT CAN HIT THE INDUSTRIAL, FERTILIZER AND FOOD CROP SECTORS” When Qatari production halted, helium spot prices doubled, exposing markets such as South Korea. The country produces more than 80% of the world’s AI memory chips and sources around 65% of its helium imports from Qatar. Agriculture experienced similar knock-on effects. Around half of Morocco’s sulphur supply, a critical input for phosphate fertilizer production, transits through the Strait of Hormuz. When Gulf sulphur exports fell by 40%, prices doubled and Morocco phosphate fertilizer output declined by up to 30% in Q2 2026. As the world’s largest phosphate fertilizer supplier, the disruption carried the energy shock directly into global agriculture. Yet the squeeze on agriculture extended well beyond the loss of fertilizer supplies. Higher diesel prices increased the cost of farming, irrigation and transport. They also made biofuels more competitive, encouraging crops to shift from food to fuel production and placing further pressure on food availability and prices.

13 1.4 ENERGY SHOCKS ARE RESHAPING INDUSTRY The Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrated how energy shocks can reshape the geography of industry. Following the loss of Russian gas supplies, EU gas demand fell by approximately 20%, partly driven by a ~30% decline in output across energy-intensive industries from pre-conflict levels, as shown in Figure 5. Some energy-intensive production shifted toward regions with more competitive energy costs, illustrating how disruption can reallocate industrial activity as well as reduce demand. UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “RISKS ARE MOVING. THEY DON’T SIT IN ONE PART OF THE VALUE CHAIN OR ONE PART OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN” FIGURE 5:EU gas demand profile and industrial activityxxiv Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global

14 FIGURE 6:China electric vehicle export growthxxv 1.5 A NEW WAVE OF DEMAND IS REDEFINING ENERGY MARKETS As energy systems contend with growing disruptions, they must also accommodate a new wave of demand growth. The combined impact of electrification, artificial intelligence and economic expansion in emerging markets will require significant investment in generation, grids, storage and energy infrastructure, placing additional pressure on systems that are already becoming more complex and vulnerable. Artificial intelligence is rapidly becoming one of the most significant new sources of electricity demand. Global data-power capacity is projected to more than double from approximately 230 GW today to over 500 GW by 2030, with AI expected to account for 25–35% of data-power demand by the end of the decade, as shown in Figure 7. UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “BANKABLE DEMAND IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RESILIENCE” Transport markets are shifting amid fuel security and oil price volatility. These pressures have strengthened the economic case for electrification in transport, accelerating the adoption of battery electric vehicles. This trend is already visible in international trade, with Chinese battery electric vehicle exports increasing significantly since March 2026, as shown in Figure 6. Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global Rapid data center expansion is already placing significant pressure on power infrastructure and supply chains. High demand and longer lead times for generation equipment such as gas-fired capacity is leading to rising costs for new gas-fired capacity. FIGURE 7:Global data center capacity editions

15 FIGURE 8:Projected growth in global energy and electricity demandxxiii Yet alongside these shifts in demand, a much larger wave of energy demand is emerging across developing economies. Non-OECD economies, excluding China, are expected to account for around 90% of global energy demand growth through 2060, adding demand equivalent of an entire China today, as shown in Figure 8. Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global Majlis participants across the public and private sector stressed that the energy system must therefore contend with two pressures simultaneously: managing greater exposure to disruption while meeting substantial new demand from economic growth, electrification and AI.

16 02 Resilience must be valued as an investment in long-term stability and growth, with capital mobilized through bankable projects

17 Participants emphasized that resilience requires sustained investment, but the priorities will differ across markets depending on where vulnerabilities are greatest. The challenge is to invest ahead of disruption, direct capital toward the most critical gaps and create the conditions for resilience projects to attract funding at scale. 2.1 ENERGY VULNERABILITIES VARY BY REGION, REQUIRING TARGETED INVESTMENT STRATEGIES The ENACT analysis by S&P Global Energy assessed five dimensions of vulnerability: import exposure, chokepoint exposure, storage adequacy, supply concentration and grid resilience, as shown in Figure 9. FIGURE 9:Five metrics behind the energy vulnerability indexxxiv Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global

18 Participants also emphasized that assessing vulnerability requires reconsidering whether established resilience baselines remain appropriate for today’s risk environment. For example, the IEA’s 90-day oil stockholding requirement provides a widely used benchmark for supply security, but participants questioned whether such legacy baselines remain sufficient given the scale and duration of potential disruptions. Against this legacy baseline, the analysis reveals a highly uneven vulnerability landscape. A deeper examination of the vulnerability analysis shows that risks are most acute in emerging economies such as India, East Asia and Africa, where vulnerabilities overlap with the fastest growth in final energy consumption described in section 1, compounding overall system risk (Figure 10). Note: Regional groupings used in this analysis are defined as follows: East Africa includes Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda; East Asia includes Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; North Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia; Southeast Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam; Europe includes the EU-27 countries, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. 2.1 ENERGY VULNERABILITIES VARY BY REGION, REQUIRING TARGETED INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FIGURE 10:Mapping regional energy system vulnerabilities and energy demand growthxxiv Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global

19 UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “EMERGING MARKETS MUST BUILD FOR GROWTH AND RESILIENCE AT THE SAME TIME”

20 2.1 ENERGY VULNERABILITIES VARY BY REGION, REQUIRING TARGETED INVESTMENT STRATEGIES VULNERABILITIES VARY BY REGION, A MORE RESILIENT ENERGY SYSTEM REQUIRES TARGETED STRATEGIES Specific vulnerabilities for each region are shown in Figure 11. Gaps in storage days across high importing countries in Asia for instance highlights a dual vulnerability. Similarly, chokepoint exposure in India and East Africa and supply concentration in Mexico and North Africa highlight the need for diversifying supply sources. FIGURE 11:Example of vulnerabilities across markets and vulnerability metrics Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global USA Grid Status 41% EUROPE Crude Oil And Gas Import Exposure 47% LNG Supply Concentration 43% Grid Status 35% MEXICO Natural Gas Storage Risk 89 days required Natural Gas Supply Concentration¹ 85% EAST AFRICA Refined Products Chokepoint Risk 87% Refined Products Import Exposure 55% INDIA Natural Gas Storage Risk 75 days required Chokepoint Exposure 75% Exposure Level Low High

21 Majlis attendees concurred that resilience cannot be built through a one-size-fits-all approach and strategies must reflect each market’s specific vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities provide a basis for estimating the investment required to raise resilience across strategic storage, cybersecurity, infrastructure redundancy and supply diversification. NORTH AFRICA Natural Gas Storage Risk 68 days required Crude Oil Supply Concentration 46% EAST ASIA (JKT) Fossil Fuels Import Exposure 84% Natural Gas Storage Risk 50 days required AUSTRALIA Oil & Products Storage Risk 40 days required Grid Status 40% Refined Product Import Exposure 28% SOUTHEAST ASIA Fossil Fuels Import Exposure 43% Natural Gas Storage Risk 23 days required Exposure Level Low High

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23 The vulnerability assessment is a starting point for capital allocation, not a project-ranking exercise. Areas of elevated exposure point to different investment pathways: storage and diversified supply for importing markets; alternative routes and shared terminals around chokepoints; and grid, cybersecurity and flexibility investment where systems face rising power demand. 2.2 FROM EXPOSURE TO INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY 2. It does not include investment to protect energy infrastructure against climate-related events, or to strengthen the cyber and physical security of other non-power critical infrastructure, such as refineries. UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “THE $675 BILLION WILL GROW EXPONENTIALLY THE LONGER WE WAIT TO COLLECTIVELY RESPOND.” FIGURE 12: Illustrative Investment to Strengthen Global Energy Resilience to a Baseline Level, $US Billion Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global Establishing a global resilience baseline could require $445–675 billion S&P Global Energy analysis conducted for the ENACT Majlis illustrates that strengthening selected areas of the global energy system to a baseline level of resilience could require $445 to $675 billion in investment, as shown in Figure 12.

24 2.2 FROM EXPOSURE TO INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY For this analysis, the baseline represents a defined set of measures to strengthen supply security and the ability to withstand disruption. In practice, meeting this baseline could require: • Bypass pipelines: build pipeline infrastructure that provides an alternative route around a critical chokepoint, allowing supply flows to be maintained when the primary maritime corridor is disrupted or contracting. • Strategic storage: build oil and gas storage to provide a 90-day import buffer. For gas, that translates into over 90 Mt of additional gas storage globally required to increase from its 36 days of import coverage today. For oil, that means approximately 450 million barrels of additional storage. • Alternative shipping routes: Add shipping capacity to maintain flows when vessels are rerouted around chokepoints. For example, rerouting traffic from the Strait of Malacca to the Lombok and Makassar Straits would require approximately 95 additional oil and LNG carriers to maintain current transit volumes. • Power system cybersecurity: upgrade cyber protection across predominantly power generation and transmission assets to strengthen resilience to cyber disruption. The analysis illustrates what this investment could entail in practice. It does not represent the full investment required for global energy resilience, while cybersecurity costs remain particularly uncertain as threats evolve. While illustrative, the estimate underlines the scale of the resilience challenge and the potential for investment needs to rise as threats and vulnerabilities evolve. UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “YOU CANNOT COMPENSATE FOR A DECADE OF UNDERINVESTMENT OVERNIGHT. WE MUST CONTINUE INVESTING IN THE ENERGY SYSTEM WE HAVE WHILE BUILDING THE ONE WE NEED.” 3. Filling new storage capacity would require roughly $70-80 billion of additional working capital, that is not included in Figure 12. 4. It does not include investment to protect energy infrastructure against climate-related events, or to strengthen the cyber and physical security of other non-power critical infrastructure, such as refineries.

25 Investing in resilience before disruption can avoid much larger costs later. Recent crises have demonstrated the value of early investment in storage, diversification and grid resilience. Illustrative analysis across Germany, India and Kenya suggests that the economic cost of disruption can significantly exceed preventive resilience investment - by more than 20 times in one case (illustrative comparisons based on different country-specific assumptions). The Cost of Import Dependence Germany’s reliance on Russian gas translated into €268bn of crisis costs, around 24x the ~€11bn that could have strengthened supply diversification through LNG storage and pipeline infrastructure. The Price of Thin Import Buffers Kenya’s limited import buffers contributed to a $2bn increase in fuel import costs, around 7x the ~$0.3bn investment needed to build a 90-day storage buffer. The Value of Strategic Storage The Hormuz disruption imposed an estimated $46bn burden on India, nearly 2x the ~$25bn investment that could have strengthened crude oil, LNG and LPG strategic storage. 2.3 BUILDING RESILIENCE AHEAD OF DISRUPTION CAN COST SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN THE RESPONSE G E R M A N Y 15 Russian gas supply cut-off, 2022 24x DISRUPTION VS RESILIENCE COST IN D IA 16 Strait of Hormuz disruption, 2026 ~2x DISRUPTION VS RESILIENCE COST (ONGOING) K E N Y A 17 Strait of Hormuz disruption, 2026 ~7x DISRUPTION VS RESILIENCE COST (ONGOING) The discussion reinforced a clear economic choice: recognize and value resilience before disruption occurs or absorb potentially much greater costs when it does. Participants agreed that investing in resilience carries a visible cost today, but it can avoid significantly greater economic losses, recovery costs and instability when disruption occurs. TABLE 3: COST OF DISRUPTION VERSUS COST OF RESILIENCE IN RECENT ENERGY CRISES ILLUSTRATIVE COUNTRY COMPARISONS UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “THE COST OF DISRUPTION HAS COME DOWN WHILE THE VALUE OF RESILIENCE HAS GONE UP.” UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “RESILIENCE ACTUALLY IS THE PRICE OF STABLE RETURNS.”

26 2.4 THE FINANCING TOOLS ALREADY EXIST BUT NEED TO BE MODERNIZED Participants highlighted that the investment mechanisms that account for risk pricing already exist. Established underwriting, risk-pricing and insurance mechanisms can be leverged to identify and make resilience opportunities investable. Representatives from major infrastructure funds highlighted investment mechanisms that are deployed today across different asset types that should be leveraged more specifically for resilience: • Individual asset investments: Investors price the risk at the asset-level and negotiate with counterparties who in-turn decide if the price of resilience is worth it. This can include for instance investments in new pipelines or datacenters. The market is effectively pricing those risks. • System-wide investments: Pricing these risks is more complex than the asset-level risks. This is observed most visibly in the electric grid, where resilience requirements don’t sit in a single asset. The common approach to finance these investments has been to socialize the cost across the system’s players through tools such as incentives and government mandates. In such cases, political and regulatory support is required to support decision making. • Strategic asset investments: This covers investments in assets that are not economical in the established base case scenario but provide a UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “THE TOOLS TO FINANCE RESILIENCE ALREADY EXIST.” “THE SHORTAGE IS NOT IN CAPITAL, BUT IN BANKABLE PROJECTS.” broader public value. This includes for instance strategic petroleum or gas reserves and reserve power generation capacity. In this case, private capital can work, but it is typically deployed under a capacity payment model. Governments are typically counter parties paying for the asset. The challenge is therefore not a lack of capital or financial mechanisms but creating partnership structures that make resilience investable and allocating its costs appropriately. At the asset level, resilience can be incorporated into conventional underwriting. At the system and strategic levels, government intervention, regulation or public- private partnerships may be needed where the benefits extend beyond the individual investor. The opportunity is to modernize and deploy them effectively in the context of resilience, particularly in determining how costs are allocated across investors, governments and consumers. FINANCING LENS / WHO PAYS, WHO BENEFITS, AND WHAT IS BANKABLE? Asset-level resilience can be priced through project underwriting and operators’ own investment decisions; system-wide resilience may need regulated returns or capacity/availability payments; and strategic reserves or bypass infrastructure may justify government participation and cross-border agreements. Each opportunity should be tested against a beneficiary, a paying mechanism and a credible operator — not simply the size of the vulnerability.

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28 03 Resilience requires balancing efficiency with preparedness, flexibility and recovery, underpinned by better data and visibility across increasingly interconnected supply chains

29 Participants stressed that greater resilience would require a deliberate shift from optimizing primarily for efficiency to preparing for disruption. This means protecting critical assets, diversifying sources and routes, and strengthening the operational and commercial flexibility needed to respond and recover when disruptions occur. Strengthen the physical and digital protection of critical infrastructure through protective engineering, preventative maintenance and continuous monitoring. Protection increasingly requires identifying vulnerabilities before they become failures or are exploited. 3.1 INTEGRATED ASSET HARDENING AND PROTECTION UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “BY 2040, MOST SUPPLY WILL STILL COME FROM KNOWN SOURCES. EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE MUST REMAIN THE CENTRAL FOCUS OF RESILIENCE.” UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “RISKS MAY SIT SEVERAL LAYERS DOWN A COMPANY’S VALUE CHAIN.” Low-cost drones are making physical attacks on critical infrastructure easier and cheaper to carry out. Participants stressed the need to respond by hardening critical assets and reducing their physical exposure. This can include moving selected infrastructure underground or designing systems with fewer exposed points of failure. Cybersecurity was also a particular focus. Participants noted that AI is accelerating the sophistication and scale of cyber threats, while also strengthening the tools available to detect and respond to them. This will require greater integration of physical and digital security across critical infrastructure.

30 FIGURE 13: Global shipping order book and VLCC price increasexxvi Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global 3.2 SUPPLY SOURCE AND COUNTERPARTY DIVERSIFICATION The shipping market illustrates the growing value of this optionality. Repeated disruption across major trade routes has increased demand for immediately available shipping capacity. Global ship orderbooks have more than doubled from pre-conflict levels. Prices for 5- and 10-year-old VLCCs have also risen sharply (Figure 13) as operators compete for vessels that can be deployed immediately. Governments can provide another layer of flexibility. Emergency, reciprocal and government-to-government arrangements can secure alternative access before a crisis occurs. Participants highlighted the value of regional cooperation and strategic reserves, particularly where supply chains cross multiple jurisdictions. Diversification reduces concentration risk and preserves options when established sources or routes are disrupted. Importers can diversify suppliers, counterparties and contract structures. Exporters can diversify production, customers and routes to maintain market access as trade flows shift. UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “DISRUPTION HITS HARDEST WHERE VULNERABILITY IS GREATEST” “OPTIONALITY HAS A COST.” Participants agreed that diversification needs to extend across the wider supply chain. This includes transport routes, strategic inventories and critical suppliers. Several also pointed to a shift toward more local and regional supply chains. Better visibility of dependencies will be critical to identifying where concentration risks remain.

31 3.3 OPERATIONAL AND COMMERCIAL PREPAREDNESS Perhaps most importantly, participants agreed that preparing for disruptions that cannot be avoided by strengthening the ability to adapt, respond and recover quickly. Commercial and operational mechanisms can help manage constrained supply and serve priority demand. These include dynamic curtailment, critical- load allocation, preventative monitoring and supportive payment mechanisms. Participants placed particular emphasis on organizational readiness and speed of decision-making. Traditional hierarchical operating models can slow response during fast-moving disruptions. Frontline teams need clearer decision rights and the authority to act when conditions change. This can include shutting down operations or redirecting resources without waiting for multiple layers of approval. Preparedness also needs to extend beyond the initial response. Companies should know in advance how critical operations will be restored. This means understanding repair requirements, access to spare parts, recovery timelines and the people needed to bring assets back online. Stress testing and crisis exercises can expose these gaps before a real disruption. Commercial and market structures can keep flexible capacity available before it is needed. Capacity and availability payments can compensate for assets to remain on standby, allowing existing infrastructure to respond when the system comes under stress. China UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE provides one example per the case study below. UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “IN A CRISIS, DECISION-MAKING HAS TO MOVE TO THE FRONTLINE.” “PREPAREDNESS IS KNOWING HOW YOU WILL RECOVER BEFORE THE DISRUPTION HAPPENS” UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “THE TOOLS TO FINANCE RESILIENCE ALREADY EXIST.” CASE STUDY / FLEXIBLE CAPACITY PAYMENTS Following multiple power and fuel supply crises, over 400GW of coal capacity has been retrofitted to operate at lower loads (20-30% of capacity). Commercially, this was supported by capacity payments that compensate plants for remaining available when needed. China’s coal-unit flexibility retrofits and capacity remuneration provide a working example of paying for availability, rather than energy output alone. The relevant lesson is the financing principle: a standby or flexible resource can be valuable even when rarely dispatched.

32 04 AI, robotics and physical intelligence can transform how energy systems anticipate threats, optimize assets, respond to disruption and recover — provided they are deployed at scale

33 Beyond investments, success will depend on leveraging technologies such as AI to anticipate risks, strengthen decision-making and accelerate recovery when disruptions occur. AI and robotics are creating opportunities to redesign how energy systems are built, operated and protected. Participants highlighted successfully deployed applications in predictive maintenance, physical asset intelligence, digital twins, FIGURE 14:Examples of AI applications across the energy sector 4.1 STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE THROUGH AI Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “THERE IS NOT A LOT OF DATA ABOUT HOW THE PHYSICAL WORLD OPERATES, ROBOTICS OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY TO AUTONOMOUSLY AND COST-EFFECTIVELY COLLECT IT” cyber defence and autonomous decision-making. Several pointed to the growing use of AI-enabled monitoring systems across critical infrastructure, including pipeline networks where advanced analytics are already being used to identify anomalies and potential threats across thousands of kilometres of assets. Critically, Majlis attendees stressed that delivering impact at scale depends on reliable data, common standards, redesigned operating processes and appropriate human oversight. This is particularly important as operators manage vast networks of critical infrastructure, often with limited visibility across thousands of kilometres of pipelines and power networks. Robotics, sensors and remote monitoring can help close these gaps by capturing physical-world data at scale, providing the foundation AI needs to identify vulnerabilities, anticipate problems and support faster decisions.

34 FIGURE 15: Example of AI use case to optimize efficiency in energy-intensive sectors Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global 4.1 STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE THROUGH AI In parallel, AI can play an important role in optimizing energy use. Across energy-intensive sectors, it can improve how energy and resources are managed, reducing consumption and improving overall system efficiency (Figure 15). Over time, these gains could help offset some of the additional energy demand created by AI and data centers themselves. Participants agreed that AI can both optimize for efficiency while building systems capable of withstanding disruption and responding quickly.

35 4.2 A CATALYST FOR THREATS AND SOLUTIONS Several speakers noted that while AI can improve monitoring, cybersecurity, forecasting and emergency response, it is simultaneously increasing the sophistication, speed and accessibility of cyber-attacks. In one instance, a participant shared that, a cyber- attack required the mobilization of approximately 400 personnel to restore systems and operations, illustrating the substantial operational burden these events can impose. AI is also lowering the barrier to sophisticated physical attacks. The discussion referred to recent geopolitical conflicts across Europe and the Middle East as examples of how AI combined with inexpensive drone technologies can identify and target conventional physical assets in ways that were previously much harder or more expensive. As energy systems become increasingly digitalized, organizations will need to invest not only in AI deployment, but also in the cybersecurity, governance and workforce capabilities required to manage these emerging threats. Ultimately, participants agreed that AI should be deployed against clearly defined resilience challenges, with success measured through tangible operational outcomes rather than technological ambition alone. UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “AI IS A CATALYST FOR THE CHALLENGE, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT IS ALSO A CATALYST FOR THE SOLUTION.” ANALYTICAL FEATURE / DEFENSE INVESTMENT AS A CATALYST FOR ENERGY INNOVATION A provocative argument raised at the Majlis was that defense investment has historically accelerated technologies that subsequently transformed the energy sector. Naval nuclear propulsion helped advance civilian nuclear power, while the space race provided an early catalyst for the development and adoption of solar photovoltaic technology. As global defense expenditure rises, this relationship could become increasingly important. The demands of modern warfare are driving innovation in autonomous systems, advanced materials, sensing and battery technologies. In particular, the need for smaller, lighter and more powerful energy storage could accelerate advances in battery chemistry, miniaturization and energy density, with potential applications across electric mobility, industrial robotics and renewable energy integration. The opportunity is for energy to benefit from an expected wave of defense-led innovation, translating advances in storage, AI, robotics and physical intelligence into more efficient, secure and resilient energy systems. FIGURE 16: Global defense spending by country and regionxxii Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global 1. Military expenditure is allocated across four main categories: Infrastructure, Equipment, Personnel, and Others Sources: NATO (2025), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2025). Compiled on August 8, 2025 © 2026 S&P Global

36 4.3 FROM INDIVIDUAL AI APPLICATIONS TO SYSTEM-WIDE INTELLIGENCE CASE STUDY / FRONTIER AI IN ENERGY At ENACT, leaders called for a step change in deploying AI and robotics to strengthen energy resilience. The following day, ADNOC announced a landmark multi-year partnership with OpenAI and G42, becoming the first energy company to deploy OpenAI Frontier technology. Building on ADNOC’s industrial expertise and existing AI capabilities, the partnership will connect intelligence across the entire energy value chain - moving beyond optimizing individual assets to integrating operational, capital and commercial decisions. TWO TRANSFORMATIVE APPLICATIONS: 01 INTEGRATED FIELD PLANNING Connecting decades of data from thousands of wells, multiple reservoirs and surface facilities with capital and commercial considerations. The ambition is to reduce complex field development planning from months to hours, while optimizing entire fields rather than individual assets. 02 WELL-TO-MARKET INTELLIGENCE Deploying interconnected AI agents to anticipate market conditions and evaluate decisions across production, processing, refining, logistics, sales and trading — enabling faster, more informed and coordinated decisions across the value chain. THE RESILIENCE OPPORTUNITY From optimizing individual assets to building connected, intelligent energy systems that anticipate risks, adapt faster and strengthen reliability across the entire value chain.

37 FROM DIALOGUE TO DELIVERY ADIPEC 2026 / Turning resilience priorities into commercial action ENACT identified the need to invest ahead of disruption, strengthen critical infrastructure and mobilize capital and partnerships to build more resilient energy systems. In the four days that followed, ADIPEC carried these priorities into commercial dialogue and delivery, demonstrating practical progress toward more reliable energy and stronger, more connected infrastructure. It was another record-breaking edition, bringing together 240,000 participants from 170 countries, with US$67 billion deals recorded across the event. ADIPEC 2026 was defined by energy resilience and intelligence, not as ends in themselves, but as enablers of global stability and growth. INVESTING AHEAD OF DEMAND: 345 MILLION SCF/DAY ADNOC RUWAIS DIYAB ADNOC approved the development of a new unconventional gas resource, targeting production of 345 million standard cubic feet per day from 2029. Supported by new processing and pipeline infrastructure, the project will expand domestic gas supply and strengthen long-term energy reliability. DR. SULTAN AHMED AL JABER OPENING ADDRESS, ADIPEC 2026 NOVEMBER 2, 2026 “First, accessible supply. We need expanded strategic storage, larger stockpiles of products and flexible refining capacity closer to consumer markets. Second, routes to market. Supply only counts when it arrives. Infrastructure must be built before it is needed and enabled by advanced logistics. Third, operational intelligence. Moving from automated operations to intelligent energy systems that anticipate risk, optimize performance and drive down the cost of every barrel. Fourth, capital follows confidence. Policy must create it, finance must accelerate it, and insurance must keep trade moving. And fifth, which in my view is the most important, is people because behind every barrel that arrives is a person who made sure it did. Systems don’t carry responsibility: people do.” STRENGTHENING SUPPLY PARTNERSHIPS: UP TO 1.6 MT FIVE-YEAR LNG SUPPLY ADNOC GAS × TOTAL ENERGIES A new long-term LNG supply agreement reinforced the importance of dependable producers, trusted commercial relationships and reliable access to global energy markets. MOBILIZING CAPITAL FOR INFRASTRUCTURE: $1.39 BILLION TA’ZIZ STRATEGIC PROJECTS TA’ZIZ secured financing for its terminal and ammonia projects in Ruwais, with both transactions oversubscribed. The financing advances new long-term investment in industrial production, storage and export infrastructure. MOBILIZING CAPITAL WITH CUSTOMER ECONOMIES: US$1BN ADNOC x JAPAN BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Co-financing agreement to support lower-carbon LNG operations and power infrastructure, demonstrating the role of international financial partnerships in advancing long-term energy investment together with customer economies.

38 05 Resilience is ultimately a collective endeavor: trusted partnerships, effective policy and public understanding will be critical to mobilizing capital, sharing risk and intelligence, and sustaining investment at scale

39 Infrastructure, capital and technology are necessary foundations of resilience, but they are not sufficient on their own. Resilient energy systems also require a fundamental redesign, trusted partnerships, effective policy frameworks and public confidence in the decisions being made. Participants emphasized that resilience should be designed into energy systems from the outset. Greenfield projects provide an opportunity to embed redundancy, flexibility and security by design. Participants highlighted that standardization for instance can also accelerate deployment and recovery. 5.1 EMBED RESILIENCE THROUGH SYSTEM REDESIGN UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “IT’S BETTER TO INTEGRATE RESILIENCE AT THE BEGINNING WHEN WE BEGIN TO INVEST.” “RESILIENCE SHOULD BE ONE OF THE KEY CRITERIA IN SYSTEM DESIGNS.” Standardized common equipment and components can be moved, replaced and repaired faster when disruption occurs. This extends beyond individual assets. Supply chains should be designed around critical dependencies and downstream vulnerabilities. Digital and physical infrastructure also need to be developed together. Participants cautioned that simply adding AI to existing systems will not unlock its full potential. Future systems should instead be designed with AI capabilities in mind from the outset.

40 5.2 BUILD PARTNERSHIPS THAT SHARE RISK AND INTELLIGENCE Participants consistently emphasized that resilience cannot be built in isolation. As risks become more interconnected, stronger partnerships between governments, industry and technology providers will be essential. Trusted relationships can accelerate intelligence sharing, strengthen preparedness, mobilize investment and distribute risk more effectively. For instance, participants stressed that joint training exercises between companies and governments can test information-sharing, decision making and recovery procedures. This allows companies to refine their processes before a real disruption occurs. Majlis attendees argued that trust is not simply an enabler of resilience, but one of its most important foundations. 50x War-risk insurance costs increased from ~0.25% to 5-10% of vessel value in Hormuz S U R G E I N I N S U R A N C E P R E M I U M S $20m Insurance costs reached up to $25m per LNG voyage for a $250m vessel P E R - T R A N S I T L N G I N S U R A N C E C O S T Some systemic risks can become too large, concentrated or uncertain for individual companies or private markets to absorb alone. Insurance provides a clear example of why resilience increasingly depends on cooperation across governments, industry and financial institutions. Insurance enables risks to be priced and transferred and is therefore fundamental to investment. In the recent conflict, threat actors have sought to discourage insurers from covering certain assets or routes by warning that insured assets could be targeted. This can make coverage unavailable or prohibitively expensive at the very moment it is most needed. The insurance market’s response to the Hormuz crisis serves as a clear example of that. TABLE 5:INSURANCE MARKET SIGNAL TO HORMUZ CRISIS UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “TRUST IS THE KEYWORD HERE.”

41 This reinforces the need for closer coordination between governments and insurers, supported by more consistent policy frameworks. Public-private mechanisms can also help share risks that individual companies or private markets cannot absorb alone (Figure 17). Participants also highlighted the importance of aligning resilience objectives with competitiveness and growth. Rather than viewing resilience as a defensive exercise, they argued that investments in infrastructure, technology and industrial capability can strengthen long-term economic performance while reducing vulnerabilities. UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “INSURANCE HAS BECOME A TOOL OF WAR.” “THE BEST WAY TO DEFEND OURSELVES IS TO GROW.” “PROTECTING CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRES COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENTS TO WORK TOGETHER.” FIGURE 17:New partnership models to share cost of energy resilience Analysis by S&P Global Energy © 2026 S&P Global

42 STRENGTHENING POLICY, INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC TRUST Policy frameworks can play an important role in strengthening resilience by providing the long-term certainty needed to support investment and preserve critical system capabilities. Participants emphasized the importance of considering security, competitiveness and sustainability together, and of assessing the wider resilience implications of policy decisions. This requires understanding the full system value of strategic assets before they are retired or replaced. One participant pointed to refining capacity as one example: Europe has retired approximately 2.8 million barrels per day of refining capacity over the past two decades. Recent disruptions have demonstrated that supply security depends not only on access to crude oil but also on the ability to process and distribute it. Storage, refining and other strategic capabilities may therefore need to be considered through a broader resilience lens. UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “INVESTMENT CYCLES GO BEYOND ANY GOVERNMENT TERM; LONG-TERM POLICY FRAMEWORKS ARE CRITICAL.” “WITHOUT PUBLIC TRUST, AI RISKS BECOMING A SOURCE OF RESISTANCE RATHER THAN PROGRESS.” Participants further noted that resilience extends beyond infrastructure to the resilience of policymaking itself. They called for stronger institutional capabilities, longer-term decision-making and greater consideration of second-order impacts across the energy system. Public trust in the development and deployment of AI also took center stage. Governments, energy companies and technology leaders were encouraged to communicate the benefits and trade-offs of AI more clearly, address concerns around jobs, affordability and security, and invest in education and workforce development. Several participants argued that AI should be deployed against clearly defined resilience challenges, with success measured through practical outcomes rather than technological ambition alone. UNATTRIBUTED QUOTE “WE NEED TO BRING THE PUBLIC ALONG AS AI DEVELOPS AND SCALES.”

43 1 Embed resilience in capital allocation. Recognize the full economic cost of disruption and the value of investing early in redundancy, infrastructure protection and operational flexibility. 2 Direct investment to the greatest vulnerabilities. Expand and strengthen critical infrastructure, storage, alternative supply routes, power networks and other points of systemic exposure. Accelerate the next frontier of AI and robotics and unlock barriers to implementation across systems. Move beyond efficiency gains to deploy technologies that anticipate threats, adapt operations in real time and accelerate recovery when disruption occurs. 3 4 Mobilize investment through new partnerships. Develop financing models that bring together governments, industry, technology companies and investors to share risks, unlock capital and scale practical solutions. 5 Advance practical industry collaboration on preparedness. Explore mechanisms to share risk intelligence, develop common standards, stress- test critical vulnerabilities and support joint exercises and lessons learned. Moving Resilience from Ambition to Action The Majlis identified five priorities to move global energy resilience from ambition to action: WHAT THESE PRIORITIES COULD ENABLE Use the vulnerability mapping to shortlist project opportunities; test asset-, system- and strategic-level financing models; develop a small set of measurable AI and robotics applications; assess cross-border arrangements such as reciprocal stockholding; and identify volunteers for common standards, risk intelligence and practical preparedness exercises. These are possible areas for continuing work, not commitments agreed by participants. The ENACT Majlis demonstrated that building energy resilience is no longer simply about protecting infrastructure or responding to disruption. It requires a fundamental shift in how energy systems are designed, financed and operated, with greater intelligence, flexibility and cooperation embedded from the outset. The opportunity now is to turn these shared insights into investment and practical action - creating more resilient and intelligent energy systems capable of supporting the next phase of global economic growth.

44 Acknowledgements We would like to thank all participants in ENACT Majlis 2026 for their time, openness and contributions.

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